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Cite as: Stacy A. Manning, Dismissing How the Purchaser-Seller Rule Affects 
SLUSA, 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 304 (2006), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v1-
1/manning.pdf. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In April, 2005, the Seventh Circuit decided the case of Kircher v. 
Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Investment Management, L.L.C.1 
The result of this case limits the viability of  state court securities 
actions by expanding the standing requirements for federal securities 
actions and by declaring that certain actions will either be preempted, 
compelled to be brought as derivative actions, or committed to public 
prosecutors.2    
In Kircher, the plaintiff class, defining itself as entirely non-sellers 
and non-purchasers, brought suit in state court alleging securities 
fraud.3   The issue on appeal was whether their state law claims were 
preempted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
(“SLUSA”).4   The Seventh Circuit held that the purchaser-seller rule 
announced in the Supreme Court case Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores5 did not affect SLUSA’s coverage, and therefore a 
plaintiff class that only held securities, as opposed to one that 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.S., Psychology, 
University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana 2001. 
1 403 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2005). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 480, 482. 
4 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000). 
5 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
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purchased or sold securities, would nevertheless have their claims 
preempted by SLUSA.6   In addition, the Seventh Circuit held, in 
contradiction to its sister circuits, that the recourse for a non-trading 
class was to file a derivative action or commit the case to public 
prosecutors as opposed to relegating the case to state court.7 
Part I of this note outlines the relevant federal securities laws at 
issue, including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PSLRA”),8 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,9 and 
Rule 10b-5.10   Part II describes in detail the recent Seventh Circuit 
opinion in Kircher.  Part III contrasts the Kircher decision with the 
1975 Supreme Court case of Blue Chip Stamps, wherein the court held 
that plaintiffs who did not purchase or sell securities during the class 
period did not have standing to pursue a private damages action under 
Rule 10b-5.  Part IV of this note compares the Kircher decision with 
how other circuits have interpreted the scope of SLUSA.  Part V 
concludes that the Seventh Circuit was incorrect in concluding that 
SLUSA is not affected by the purchaser-seller rule in Blue Chip 
Stamps and that the proper recourse for a plaintiff class consisting of 
non-purchasers and non-sellers is to commit the case to public 
prosecutors or pursue a derivative action as opposed to litigating the 
claim in state court. 
 
I.  SLUSA 
 
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)11 to “curb abuses of federal securities 
fraud litigation” arising under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
                                                 
6 Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483-84. 
7 Id. at 484. 
8 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 
78u-4 (2000)). 
9 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
10 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2005).   
11 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4). 
2
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Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.12  Pursuant to Rule 10b-5, which 
is based on § 10(b) of the 193413 Act: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact 
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.14 
 
Heightened pleading standards for class action plaintiffs were one 
of the reforms that the PSLRA imposed.15  However, a loophole was 
created, allowing plaintiffs to avoid the PSLRA’s pleading 
                                                 
12 Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 31 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000)).  
For example, the PSLRA sought to deter strike suits in which private plaintiffs filed 
federal securities fraud claims of questionable merit in order to obtain large 
settlements.  See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (emphasis added). 
15 Dabit, 395 F.3d at 32 (citing 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)).  For example, a 
complaint under the PSLRA must allege that the defendant made an “untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading.”  In addition, “the complaint shall specify each statement 
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is 
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on 
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which 
that belief is formed.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). 
3
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requirements by filing suits in state courts under state statutory or 
common law.16  As a result, the PSLRA failed to achieve its goal of 
curtailing meritless class actions, and in response Congress enacted the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”) in 1998.17 
Congress enacted SLUSA in order to “prevent certain State private 
securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to 
frustrate the objectives” of the PSLRA.18  Too many securities class 
action lawsuits had shifted from federal to state courts, thereby making 
it difficult to hold securities class action plaintiffs to the stringent 
standards of the PSLRA.19 Under SLUSA, Congress intended to close 
the loophole “by making federal court the exclusive venue for class 
actions alleging fraud in the sale of certain covered securities and by 
mandating that such class actions be governed exclusively by federal 
law.”20  SLUSA provides parallel provisions to the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to limit certain 
class actions under state law.21  The relevant portion reads: 
 
No covered class action22 based upon the statutory 
or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may 
                                                 
16 Dabit, 395 F.3d at 32. 
17 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000). 
18 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112 
Stat. 3227 (1998). 
19 Id. 
20 Dabit, 395 F.3d at 33 (quoting Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 
251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d. Cir. 2001)).  
21 Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C.,  403 F.3d 
478, 481 (7th Cir. 2005). The Court limits its attention to § 16 of the 1933 Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 77p, because the additions to the 1934 Act are functionally identical. 
22 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2). The term “covered class action” means: “(i) any 
lawsuit in which – (I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or 
prospective class members, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or 
members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized 
reliance on an alleged misstatement or omission, predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual persons or members; or (II) one or more named parties seek 
to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other 
unnamed parties similarly situated, and questions of law or fact common to those 
4
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be maintained in any State or Federal court by any 
private party alleging: 
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material 
fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
covered security; or 
(2) that the defendant used or employed any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered 
security.23  
 
In addition, SLUSA renders any covered class action brought in 
state court removable to federal court.24  According to the Second 
Circuit in Dabit, four requirements must be met in order for SLUSA to 
apply: “(1) the underlying suit must be a ‘covered class action’; (2) the 
action must be based on state or local law; (3) the action must concern 
a ‘covered security’; and (4) the defendant must have misrepresented 
or omitted a material fact or employed a manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of’ that 
security.”25  The courts were mindful that plaintiffs might seek to 
avoid federal jurisdiction by creatively framing their complaints in 
such a way as to allege that the misrepresentations were not “in 
connection with” the sale or purchase of stock.  In response to this 
type of strategy, the Eighth Circuit held that under SLUSA, a plaintiff 
“may not avoid federal question jurisdiction and the preemption of 
                                                                                                                   
persons or members of the prospective class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual persons or members; or (ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or 
pending in the same court and involving common questions of law or fact, in which 
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and (II) the lawsuits are 
joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose.”  
23 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)  (emphasis added). 
24 Id. § 77p(c). 
25 Dabit, 395 F.3d at 33 (citing Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & 
Smith, Inc. 292 F.3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
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state law claims by artfully concealing the federal question in an 
otherwise well-pleaded complaint under state law.”26 
 
II.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN KIRCHER V. PUTNAM FUNDS 
TRUST AND PUTNAM INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. 
 
In Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Investment 
Management, L.L.C., the Seventh Circuit was confronted with whether 
SLUSA preempted litigation in state court.27   The Kircher plaintiffs 
filed claims in state court alleging that the defendant mutual funds had 
set their prices in such a way that left them vulnerable to arbitrageur 
exploitation.28  Mutual funds are required to set prices at which they 
sell and redeem their own shares once each day.29  Each of the 
defendant mutual fund sets the price at which they sell and redeem 
their own shares at 4 p.m. Eastern time each day, shortly after the New 
York Stock Exchange closes.30  Any order that is placed before 4 p.m. 
is executed at that price.31  The mutual funds value securities at the 
closing price of the principal exchange or market in which the 
securities are traded.32  Whereas this yields a current price for 
domestic securities, it may produce a price that is as much as fifteen 
hours old for securities of foreign issuers.33  For example, Asian 
markets close twelve to fifteen hours before New York, and European 
markets close five or six hours ahead of New York.  Many securities 
trade on multiple markets or over the counter.34  If, for example, stock 
in Japan moves predominantly up during the interval between the 
                                                 
26 Id. at 34 (quoting Dudek v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 295 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir. 
2002)). 
27 403 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2005). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
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closing of the Asian market and the closing of the New York market, 
the mutual fund would carry a 4 p.m. price below what would be 
justified by the latest available information.35  Arbitrageurs could take 
advantage of this discrepancy by purchasing the shares of the foreign 
stock before 4 p.m. and then selling that stock for profit the following 
day.36  
The Kircher plaintiffs framed their complaints to avoid any 
allegations of purchase or sale.37  All but one of the classes were 
defined as investors who held shares of a given mutual fund during the 
class period.38 The plaintiffs alleged that the mutual funds acted 
recklessly in failing to prevent arbitrageurs from reaping the profits 
described above.39   The plaintiffs argued that the mutual funds could 
have taken such precautions by levying fees on short-swing 
transactions,40 adopting to a front-end-load charge,41 reducing the 
number of trades any investor can execute (or deferring each trade by 
one day), or valuing the securities of foreign issuers at the most 
current price in any competitive market, and not just the closing price 
on the issuers’ home stock exchanges.42   
The defendant mutual funds removed the suits to federal court and 
moved the court to dismiss the claims under SLUSA.43 Instead of 
dismissing the claims, the district court remanded each of the lawsuits, 
and the mutual funds appealed.44 Despite the plaintiffs’ claims that 
they only held shares during the relevant class period, the Seventh 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 482. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 481.  
40 Fees imposed on a corporate insider for a purchase or sale of company stock 
within a six-month period. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (8th ed. 2004). 
41 Mutual fund that charges a commission when shares are purchased. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (8th ed. 2004). 
42 Kircher, 403 F.3d at 481. 
43 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000).  
44 Kircher, 403 F.3d at 481. 
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Circuit found that allegations of purchases and sales were implicit in 
the complaint and that the plaintiffs were merely trying to evade 
SLUSA.45 In deciding whether SLUSA blocked litigation in state 
court, the Seventh Circuit held that the “in connection with” language 
of SLUSA was as broad as the parallel language in § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its corresponding regulation, 
Rule 10b-5.46  Therefore, because the plaintiffs’ claims satisfied 
SLUSA, they were preempted from litigating their claims in state 
court.47  The court further held that the purchaser-seller rule 
announced in the Supreme Court case Blue Chip Stamps did not 
restrict the coverage of SLUSA.48  As a result, the plaintiffs’ claims 
did not fall outside the ambit of the federal securities laws, and 
therefore, their claims were to be left to public enforcement or litigated 
as derivative actions instead.49  The problem with this outcome is that 
an action brought by public prosecutors or as a derivative action would 
grant no financial relief to the plaintiffs individually.  Rather, any 
relief granted would be diverted to the government or a corporation.   
 
III.  THE HEART OF THE ISSUE: HOW BLUE CHIP STAMPS V. MANOR DRUG 
STORES IMPACTS THE SCOPE OF SLUSA 
                                                 
45 Id. at 482 (finding that some plaintiffs must have purchased or increased 
their interest during the class period and that others “undoubtedly” sold some or all 
of their shares during the class period).   
46 Id. at 483-84 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77p; 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (2005)).  The pertinent part of § 10(b) states: “It shall be unlawful for any 
person . . . to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . 
. . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.”  15 U.S.C. § 78j.  The pertinent 
part of Rule 10b-5 states: “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to engage in any 
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.   
47 Id. at 484. 
48 Id. at 482-83 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 
(1975)). 
49 Id. at 484. 
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Well before the PSLRA or SLUSA were enacted, the Supreme 
Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores decided the question 
of whether a plaintiff may maintain a private cause of action under 
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, despite the 
fact that they had neither purchased nor sold any securities.50  In that 
case, the plaintiffs, comprising a company that provided stamps to 
retailers and nine retailers who owned 90% of its shares, alleged that 
the defendant Blue Chip Stamp Co. had prepared and distributed a 
prospectus containing a “materially misleading and overly 
pessimistic” appraisal of the company.51  The plaintiffs claimed that 
this prospectus was issued in order to discourage plaintiffs from 
buying Blue Chip shares so that the defendant could later sell the 
shares to the public at a higher price.52  The Court held that the 
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this cause of action under Rule 
10b-5 because such actions were limited by the purchaser-seller rule: 
only actual sellers and purchasers of securities may bring a private 
damages action under federal securities law.53 
Because of the purchaser-seller rule articulated in Blue Chip 
Stamps, plaintiffs have tried to circumvent SLUSA—and thus avoid 
federal court—by framing their complaints to avoid allegations that 
they purchased or sold securities as a result of the defendant’s 
fraudulent conduct.54  For example, in Pacific Life Insurance Co. v. 
Spurgeon, the plaintiffs defined the class as those investors who held 
the defendant’s securities during the class period but who did not 
purchase or sell shares during that period.55  Under the purchaser-
seller rule of Blue Chip Stamps, the plaintiffs would not be able to 
                                                 
50 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 725. 
51 Id. at 725-26. 
52 Id. at 26.  
53 Id. at 730-31 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d. 
Cir. 1952)). 
54 See Kircher, 403 F.3d at 482. 
55 Id. at 483. 
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maintain this as a Rule 10b-5 action.56  The defendants removed the 
case to federal court, but the district court remanded the case to state 
court.57   
As a result of these proceedings, the Kircher plaintiffs argued that 
once a private action is untenable under Blue Chip Stamps for failing 
to meet the standing requirements, that action is accordingly 
unaffected by SLUSA.58  The Kircher plaintiffs’ argument makes 
sense.  Because the Spurgeon class defined itself as those who neither 
sold nor purchased shares, it failed to meet the standing requirement 
announced in Blue Chip Stamps.59  Likewise, because the class 
members neither sold nor purchased shares, it failed the “in connection 
with the purchase or sale” requirement of SLUSA.60   Therefore, 
SLUSA should not apply to cases in which plaintiffs, such as the 
Kircher class, merely held their securities.61   
Instead of following this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit explored 
the actual meaning of SLUSA’s “in connection with” language.62  It 
compared the parallel language in §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and held that 
because all three statutes use the same language, SLUSA has the same 
scope as §10(b) and Rule 10b-5.63  That said, the court looked to the 
meaning of “in connection with the purchase or sale” under the federal 
securities laws to determine its meaning under SLUSA.64  It concluded 
that the invocation of §10(b) “does not depend on proof that the 
agency or United States purchased or sold securities; instead the ‘in 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Id. (citing Pac. Life Ins. Co. v. Spurgeon, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1126 n. 5 
(C.D. Cal. 2004).  In Spurgeon, the district court held that jurisdiction was lacking 
over Pacific Life’s declaratory action claiming non-liability under federal securities 
laws because such a federal claim only arose as a defense to a state-created action of 
breach of fiduciary duty.   
58 Id. 
59 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975). 
60 Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
10
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connection with’ language ensures that the fraud occurs in securities 
transactions rather than some other activity.”65   
This reasoning allowed the Seventh Circuit to dismiss the import 
of Blue Chip Stamps.  It rejected the argument that Blue Chip Stamps 
limited federal securities actions to situations in which the plaintiff 
traded securities.66  Rather, the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser-seller rule 
did not restrict coverage of SLUSA.67  It therefore held that 
“limitations on private rights of action to enforce § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 do not open the door to litigation about securities transactions 
under state law.”68   
In addition to disregarding the application of the purchaser-seller 
rule of Blue Chip Stamps to SLUSA, the court also disregarded the 
Supreme Court’s holding as to the proper recourse for a plaintiff who 
has merely held securities during the class period. Under Blue Chip 
Stamps, a case in which the plaintiff fails to buy or sell securities 
during the class period is not one that falls within the ambit of the 
PSLRA, and therefore it is not one that should be brought in federal 
court under federal question jurisdiction.69  Rather, such plaintiffs 
should instead seek a remedy in state courts.70  Without looking at the 
legislative history or congressional intent behind SLUSA, the Kircher 
court decided that instead of being relegated to state court, such 
plaintiffs would have to litigate the action as a derivative action or 
commit the claim to the SEC.71  This result undermines the purpose of 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. “Blue Chip Stamps came out as it did not because § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
are limited to situations in which the plaintiff itself traded securities, but because a 
private right of action to enforce these provisions is a judicial creation and the Court 
wanted to confine these actions to situations where litigation is apt to do more good 
than harm” (emphasis added).   
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 484.   
69 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975). 
70 Id. at 738 n.9 
71 Kircher, 403 F.3d at 484. 
11
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SLUSA, which was to target “only those claims that were meant to be 
brought in federal court subject to the PSLRA’s restrictions.”72   
In Kircher, the Seventh Circuit alluded that it was agreeing with 
its sister circuits who were confronted with similar claims by stating 
that it, too, found that the scope of SLUSA’s coverage tracked that of 
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5.73  However, the court failed to note that its 
sister circuits did find that the purchaser-seller rule of Blue Chip 
Stamps limited SLUSA and that in cases where the plaintiffs failed the 
Blue Chip Stamps standing requirement, the case should be brought in 
state court.74  By bypassing the significance of Blue Chip Stamps, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that the purchaser-seller rule did not affect 
SLUSA and that even in situations where the plaintiff did not buy or 
sell securities, the case still could not be brought in state court. 75  
Rather, the case must be brought as a derivative action or committed to 
public prosecutors.76  
 
IV.  COMPARING KIRCHER WITH ITS SISTER CIRCUITS 
 
The first circuit to compare the scope of SLUSA with §10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 was the Eighth 
Circuit in Green v. Ameritrade, Inc. in February, 2002.77 In Green, the 
plaintiff filed its original complaint in state court alleging that 
subscribers to the defendant’s Real-Time program made investment 
decisions to purchase or sell options based on information that the 
defendant provided.78  The defendant removed the action to federal 
                                                 
72 Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 42 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
73 Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483-84. 
74 See e.g., Dabit, 395 F.3d at 40; Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 
598-99 (8th Cir. 2002). 
75 Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483. 
76 Id. at 484. 
77 279 F.3d at 597-98.   
78 Id. at 593-94.  The Real Time service provided subscribers with real time 
stock price information with one click of a button.   
12
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court and moved to dismiss the action as preempted by SLUSA.79   
Instead of dismissing the action, the court gave the plaintiff 35 days to 
amend his complaint.80  In his amended complaint, the plaintiff 
avoided any reference to a purchase or sale and alleged that the 
defendant breached its contract when it failed to provide a certain kind 
of price information.81  The district court held that SLUSA did not 
preempt the plaintiff’s claim, and the defendant appealed.82  On 
appeal, the Second Circuit decided whether the complaint gave rise to 
a federal question under the federal securities laws as opposed to a 
state law breach of contract claim.83  In order to show preemption 
under SLUSA, the claim must satisfy four requirements: “(1) the 
action is a ‘covered class action’ under SLUSA, (2) the action purports 
to be based on state law, (3) the defendant is alleged to have 
misrepresented or omitted a material fact (or to have used or employed 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance), and (4) the 
defendant is alleged to have engaged in conduct described by criterion 
‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of a ‘covered security.’”84 
The Eighth Circuit relied on the rule announced in Blue Chip 
Stamps that a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 required that the 
plaintiff either purchased or sold the securities at issue.85  The court 
was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the language “in 
connection with” should be interpreted with flexibility, stating that 
Congress had “specifically rejected suggestions to broaden the scope 
of the statute to include mere attempts to purchase or sell a security.”86   
In reconciling Blue Chip Stamps with SLUSA, the court held that non-
                                                 
79 Id. at 594. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Id.   
83 Id. at 596. 
84 Id. The district court only found that defendant failed to meet the third 
requirement.  Id. at n.5. 
85 Id. at 597. 
86 Id.  
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sellers and non-purchasers were not preempted by SLUSA.87  Despite 
having knowledge that the plaintiff’s original complaint alleged fraud 
in connection with the sale or purchase of securities, the court did not 
conclude that sales or purchases were implied in the plaintiff’s 
amended complaint, which avoided any reference to purchases or sales 
of securities.88  It seems as though the court knew that the plaintiff was 
attempting to evade SLUSA and that the district court, in granting an 
extension to file an amended complaint, actually encouraged an artful 
crafting of the complaint in order to remain in state court.    
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Kircher found that the 
sale and purchase of securities were implied in the plaintiffs’ 
allegations, despite having any evidence of the sort that the Green 
court did.89  Another contrast between Kircher and Green is how they 
interpreted the effect of SLUSA preemption.  Whereas the Kircher 
court held that the claims of plaintiffs who did not trade would be left 
to public enforcement, the Green court held such claims should be 
remanded to state court.90    
Shortly after Green was decided, in June 2002, the Eleventh 
Circuit addressed the scope of SLUSA in Riley v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.91 In Riley, the trustees of the 
Performance Toyota, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (“Performance Plan”) 
and the trustee of the Master Packaging, Inc. 401(k) plan (“Master 
Packaging”) filed a class action in federal court against the defendant 
alleging securities fraud in connection with the purchase and retention 
of shares under Florida law.92  The Performance Plan plaintiffs then 
moved to dismiss itself from the federal court action and re-filed its 
case in state court.93  Pursuant to SLUSA, the defendant removed 
                                                 
87 Id. at 598. 
88 Id. at 593-93, 598.   
89 Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C., 403 F.3d 
478, 402 (7th Cir. 2005). 
90 Id. at 484; Green, 279 F.3d at 599. 
91 292 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2002). 
92 Id. at 1336. 
93 Id. 
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these plaintiffs back to federal court, and the plaintiffs subsequently 
moved to remand the action to state court.94  The district court denied 
the plaintiffs’ motion and dismissed both the Performance Plan and 
Master Packaging complaints under SLUSA and for lack of diversity 
jurisdiction.95  The plaintiffs appealed.96 
With respect to the Performance Plan plaintiffs, the Eleventh 
Circuit had to determine whether SLUSA applied to their claims.97   
The court first assessed the scope of the “in connection with” language 
of SLUSA as it compares to the parallel language of § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.98  The court analogized SLUSA to the latter federal securities 
laws because SLUSA was enacted as an amendment to the 1933 and 
1934 Acts.99  In essence, when enacting SLUSA, “Congress was not 
writing on a blank slate; instead, it was legislating in an area that had 
engendered tremendous amounts of litigation and received substantial 
judicial attention.”100  In addition to relying on Blue Chip Stamps for 
the rule that SLUSA does not govern claims based solely on the 
retention of securities, the Eleventh Circuit cited a more recent case, 
Gutierrez v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P.101  The court in Gutierrez held 
that SLUSA did not cover the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant’s acts 
caused them to hold securities that they otherwise would have sold.102  
With respect to the Performance Plan plaintiffs, however, SLUSA did 
apply because the plaintiffs had alleged not only that the defendant’s 
misrepresentations caused them to retain their shares, but to purchase 
them, as well.103 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Gutierrez court 
                                                 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1340. 
98 Id. at 1342. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1343. (citing Gutierrez v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 147 F. Supp. 2d 
584, 592 (W.D. Tex. 2001)).  
102 Id. at 1344 (citing Gutierrez, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 592). 
103 Id. at 1345 (citing Gutierrez, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 592).   
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that plaintiffs with retention claims were entitled to bring their claims 
in state court.104   
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit did not permit the Kircher 
plaintiffs to pursue their retention claim in state court. 105 Rather, 
according to the Seventh Circuit, the anti-fraud securities laws do not 
require proof of purchase or sale, and therefore the court may imply 
such in a plaintiff’s retention claim.106  Even if the court chose to 
believe that the Kircher class contained only non-purchasers and non-
sellers, state court would not be a viable alternative.107    
A few months later, in October 2002, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
the same issue as to whether state law fraud claims were preempted by 
SLUSA in Falkowski v. Imation Corp.108  In Falkowski, the plaintiffs 
filed suit in state court alleging breach of contract and fraud in 
connection with their employee stock options.109  Specifically, the 
defendant company and its executives had granted stock options to the 
plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants induced them 
to remain with the company by misrepresenting the value of the stock 
and options.110  The defendants removed the case to federal court, and 
the district court held that removal was proper because the plaintiffs’ 
claims were preempted by SLUSA.111  The plaintiffs appealed.112      
After concluding that the company’s stock qualified as a “covered 
security” under SLUSA, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the 
alleged misrepresentations were “in connection with the purchase or 
sale” of the defendants’ stock.113  Citing to Blue Chip Stamps, the court 
                                                 
104 Id. at 1345. 
105 Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC, et al., 403 
F.3d 478, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2005). 
106 Id. at 483. 
107 Id. at 483-84. 
108 309 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002). 
109 Id. at 1127. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1129. 
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held that the mere grant of an employee stock option was in and of 
itself a “sale” of that covered security, and therefore the plaintiffs’ 
claims satisfied SLUSA.114 
The Seventh Circuit in Kircher could have followed the reasoning 
of the Falkowski court to show that even non-traders of stock, by 
virtue of the fact that they held stock, constitute “purchasers” and 
“sellers” of securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5.115  The Falkowski 
court cited Blue Chip Stamps for the argument that under the 1933 and 
1934 Acts,  
 
[T]he holders of puts, calls, options, and other 
contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities 
have been recognized as  “purchasers” or “sellers” of 
securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5, not because of a 
judicial conclusion that they were similarly situated to 
“purchasers” or “sellers,” but because the definitional 
provisions of the 1934 Act themselves grant such 
status.116   
 
Therefore, it is sufficient that a person merely contracts to sell a 
security, even if the sale is never actually consummated, for the 
conduct to fall within the ambit of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.117  The 
court squarely held that when a company grants an employee stock 
option, that is a “sale” of that covered security, regardless of whether 
or not the employee chooses to exercise the option.118   
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit in Kircher could have made the 
more compelling argument that SLUSA nevertheless pre-empted the 
plaintiffs’ claims despite the fact that the class members never actually 
                                                 
114 Id. at 1129-30. 
115 Id. at 1129.  
116 Id.  
117 Id. The Falkowski court refers to this as the “aborted purchaser-seller 
doctrine.” Id. 
118 Id. at 1129-30.  The court did, however, place some limitation on the scope 
of this language, such that there must be “more than some tangential relation” 
between the fraud and stock sale.  Id. at 1131. 
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traded.  Instead, the court assumed that some investors must have 
purchased their interest during the class period and some members 
who owned stock at the beginning of the period must have sold some 
or all of their stock during the period.119  Therefore, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that many class members had engaged in the 
purchase and/or sale of their stock.120 
The last Circuit to address this issue was the Second Circuit in the 
case Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.121  In Dabit, 
the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit suit in district court on 
diversity grounds alleging that the defendant issued biased research 
and investment recommendations in order to obtain investment 
banking business, a violation of state law.122  The district court 
dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as 
the case was preempted by SLUSA.123  Like the plaintiffs in Kircher, 
the plaintiff in Dabit argued that SLUSA did not preempt his actions 
because the allegations did not involve misrepresentations or 
omissions of material fact “in connection with the purchase or sale of . 
. . covered securit[ies].”124   Rather, the Dabit plaintiff sought damages 
incurred when the defendant fraudulently induced him to hold certain 
securities and for lost commissions as a result of recommending 
securities based on the defendant’s false research reports.125   
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Riley,126 the Second 
Circuit held that meaning of “in connection with” under SLUSA had 
                                                 
119 Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C., 403 F.3d 
478, 482 (7th Cir. 2005).   
120 Id. 
121 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005). 
122 Id. at 28-30.  The plaintiffs filed this class action in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, and the Judicial Panel for 
Multidistrict Litigation subsequently transferred the case to the Southern District of 
New York. 
123 Id. at 28.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. 
126 Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1342 
(11th Cir. 2002).  
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the same scope as the similar language of § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.127  In addition, there was 
nothing in the statute’s text or legislative history to overcome the 
presumption that when Congress adopted SLUSA, which incorporated 
the language of § 10b and Rule 10b-5, it simultaneously adopted the 
judicial interpretation of that language in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.128  
The Dabit court dismissed the defendant and SEC’s argument that the 
purchaser-seller rule announced in Blue Chip Stamps was irrelevant to 
whether a claim was preempted by SLUSA.129  For, although Blue 
Chip Stamps provides a federal remedy only to purchasers and sellers 
of stock, non-purchasers and non-sellers could still seek a remedy 
under state law.130   Therefore, the Second Circuit conceded that the 
purchaser-seller rule limits SLUSA’s “in connection with” 
requirement, and thus it does not preempt claims in which the 
plaintiffs deny having purchased or sold securities during the relevant 
class period.131  However, the court held that Dabit’s claim 
nevertheless satisfied SLUSA because it implicitly alleged purchases 
made by plaintiff and putative class members.132 Significantly, the 
court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the claims 
without prejudice, in order to allow the plaintiff to plead a claim under 
state law.133   
                                                 
127 Dabit, 395 F.3d at 28. 
128 Id. at 36. 
129 Id. at 39. 
130 Id. at 40 (citing Blue Chip Stamps et al. v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 738 n.9 (1917).  
131 Id.  “There is no clear support in the legislative history for the conclusion 
that Congress intended SLUSA to preempt claims that do not satisfy the Blue Chip 
rule.”  Id. at 41.  “[W]e hold that in enacting SLUSA Congress sought only to ensure 
that class actions brought by plaintiffs who satisfy the Blue Chip purchaser-seller 
rule are subject to federal securities laws.”  Id. at 43. 
132 Id. at 40, 46 (finding that the entire claim should be dismissed because the 
class included members who relied on misleading or fraudulent “buy 
recommendations,” therefore satisfying the “in connection with” requirement for 
SLUSA preemption.). 
133 Id. at 47.  
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 By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Kircher reasoned that the 
standing requirement in Blue Chip Stamps did not mean that the claims 
of non-purchasers and non-sellers fell outside of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 and into state court but rather that such claims were to be left to 
public enforcement.134  While both the Kircher and Dabit courts 
ultimately concluded that purchases and sales were implicit in the 
plaintiffs’ allegations, had they not reached this conclusion, the Dabit 
court would have found that SLUSA did not preempt the plaintiff’s 
claims, and therefore the case must be decided under state law.135  
Alternatively, the Kircher court would have required the plaintiffs to 
litigate their claim as either a derivative action in federal court or to 
commit the case to public prosecutors.136 
The Second Circuit in Dabit squarely held that the Blue Chip 
Stamps’ purchaser-seller rule applied to the construction of the “in 
connection with” language under SLUSA whereas the Seventh Circuit 
in Kircher held that Blue Chip Stamps did not restrict coverage of 
SLUSA.137  Dabit declares that while the purpose of SLUSA may be 
to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to evade federal law by filing in 
state court, this would only preempt claims “that could have been 
brought in federal court to begin with.”138  Under Blue Chip Stamps, a 
plaintiff’s claim of fraud that is not in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a security is not one which could be brought in federal court.139  
Therefore, although the language “in connection with” tracks the 
similar language in § 10b and Rule 10b-5, a federal court must first 
determine whether the putative class includes purchasers or sellers 
before deciding whether the claim is preempted by SLUSA.140   
 
                                                 
134 Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C., 403 F.3d 
478, 484 (7th Cir. 2005). 
135 Id. at 482; Dabit, 395 F.3d at 40. 
136 Kircher, 403 F.3d at 484.   
137 Id. at 483; Dabit, 359 F.3d at 50-51. 
138 Dabit, 395 F.3d at 41-42 (emphasis added). 
139 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1917). 
140 Dabit, 395 F.3d at 42-43. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 In 1975, the Supreme Court decided Blue Chip Stamps, holding 
that a plaintiff must have purchased or sold securities in order to have 
standing for a Rule 10b-5 claim.141  In the alternative, a plaintiff who 
claimed that he merely held securities sand thus lacked standing must 
file a state-law securities fraud claim in state court.142  Thirty years 
later in Kircher, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the purchaser-seller 
rule announced in Blue Chip Stamps did not affect the impact of 
SLUSA, which limits certain class actions under state law where the 
plaintiff alleges securities fraud “in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a covered security.”143  Rather, the Seventh Circuit, fearful that 
plaintiffs were trying to evade SLUSA and thus federal court 
jurisdiction, read beyond the complaint to imply that the plaintiffs 
must have purchased or sold securities during the class period.144  
Furthermore, the court held that even had the class consisted of non-
purchasers and non-sellers, the proper recourse would be to commit 
the case to public prosecutors or file a derivative action as opposed to 
litigating the claim in state court.145   
The Seventh Circuit alluded that it was following the reasoning of 
its sister circuits by deciding that SLUSA’s coverage was as broad as 
the scope of private damages under Rule 10b-5.146  However, the court 
departed from decisions by the Eighth, Eleventh, and Second Circuits 
in concluding that even non-purchasers and non-sellers were 
preempted by SLUSA and that the proper recourse was not to file in 
                                                 
141 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730-31. 
142 Id. at 738 n.9. 
143 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. 
Mgmt. L.L.C., 403 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2005). 
144 Kircher, 403 F.3d at 482. 
145 Id. at 484. 
146 Id. at 483-84. 
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state court but rather to leave the case to public prosecutors or file a 
derivative action. 147  
Perhaps the Seventh Circuit was so harsh on the Kircher plaintiffs 
by refusing to lend credence to the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser-seller 
rule because it was frustrated by what it thought was the plaintiffs’ 
attempt to evade federal court.  The court stated:  
 
[P]laintiffs’ claims depend on statements made or 
omitted in connection with their own purchases of the 
funds’ securities . . . Indeed, most of the approximately 
200 suits filed against mutual funds in the last two 
years alleging that the home-exchange-valuation rule 
can be exploited by arbitrageurs have been filed in 
federal court under Rule 10b-5.  Our plaintiffs’ effort to 
define non-purchaser-non-seller classes is designed to 
evade PSLRA in order to litigate a securities class 
action in state court in the hope that a local judge or 
jury may produce an idiosyncratic award.  It is the very 
sort of maneuver that SLUSA is designed to prevent.148 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kircher impacts the use 
of the federal court’s jurisdictional powers.  By allowing 
SLUSA to preempt securities actions in which the plaintiff 
merely held as opposed to purchased or sold securities, the 
Seventh Circuit has expanded federal jurisdiction and limited 
state court jurisdiction.  Perhaps this decision was the Seventh 
Circuit’s way of curbing abuses of federal securities fraud 
litigation by preventing plaintiffs from evading federal court 
and avoiding the heightened standards imposed by the PSLRA. 
While having suspicions about potentially meritless securities 
class actions is justified, the Kircher opinion may have gone 
too far.  For, the Seventh Circuit’s decision effectively limits 
                                                 
147 Id. at 484 (stating that, “[b]y depicting their classes as containing entirely 
non-traders, plaintiffs do not take their claims outside § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”).   
148 Id. 
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plaintiffs’ remedies.  If their case is preempted by SLUSA, 
despite the fact that they did not purchase or sell securities, 
they are required to hand over their case to the SEC or pursue 
their claim as a derivative action.  As a result, plaintiffs are 
unable to obtain monetary relief for themselves, individually.    
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